It was as if
June 4, or liu si (six-four) in
Chinese, had become a new Qingming,
but one the government was embarrassed to admit existed.
Như thể 4
Tháng Sáu là lễ Thanh Minh, Tảo Mộ mới, với người TQ…
Thanh Minh
trong tiết Tháng Ba,
Lễ là Tảo Mộ, hội là Đạp Thanh
Đầu năm 78 ở
Lào Kay lần đầu tiên nhận được thư nhà, biết tin anh đi xa. (Vợ tôi
viết:
"Bố nuôi của Thái đã về quê ngoại sống, không còn ở Sài Gòn nữa"),
tôi như chợt tỉnh sau giấc hôn thụy. Bài
Nhớ Thi Sĩ viết vào lúc ấy đề tặng một thi sĩ đã mất và gửi
Anh, một
thi sĩ lưu lạc khi chúng tôi nghĩ chắc không còn ngày gặp lại. Trong
những lời
thơ vẳng trong tôi bấy giờ có cả lời thơ anh.
Thanh Tâm Tuyền: Trong Đất Trời Nhau
[Tưởng niệm Mai Thảo, tạp chí Thơ, số
Mùa Xuân 1998]. (1)
Tờ Người Kinh Tế cũng có bài về cuốn này.
Tin Văn sẽ đi liền
Twenty-five
years after the bloodshed in Beijing, new details keep emerging
This year’s
anniversary will not be mentioned by party-controlled Chinese-language
media.
Two years ago censors even tried to block online references to the
Shanghai
stock exchange when it fell 64.89 points in a day, a number that sounds
like
June 4th 1989. Few will notice this year’s information blackout, other
than the
rebels of the era, some elderly intellectuals and the relatives of
those who
died. No one expects more than a handful of small-scale isolated
efforts to
mark the occasion inside China; the only exception may be Hong Kong,
where
controls are much lighter.
But the
memories that remain are potent, as Ms Lim shows, which is why the
party still
expends so much effort in trying to suppress them. The author offers a
series
of meticulously (and often daringly) reported portraits of
participants,
beginning with one of the least-told stories of all: what the soldiers
who took
part in the killings felt about their mission. Chen Guang, now an
artist in
Beijing, was then a 17-year-old soldier with the martial-law troops. He
describes how, in order to avoid being detected by the demonstrators,
he and
his fellow soldiers dressed as civilians and made their way by subway,
bus or
on foot to the Great Hall of the People overlooking the square. Others
stormed their
way into the city, shooting indiscriminately.
Inside the
cavernous building “nerves were so taut that there were numerous
accidental
discharges, bullets flying through the ceiling of the hall”, Ms Lim
writes. Mr
Chen’s hands trembled so much as he gripped his gun preparing to move
into the
square that he was given a camera instead to record the event. He later
recalls
seeing hundreds of injured soldiers on the floor of the Great Hall of
the
People, many of them bleeding profusely after being beaten up by angry
crowds.
The party,
ever paranoid about the army’s loyalty, does not want people like Mr
Chen to
dwell on such horrors. Another, unnamed, ex-soldier tells Ms Lim that
every
soldier in his company had to hand in his ammunition after the square
was cleared.
He believed this was because the army feared the soldiers might rebel.
One of
Ms Lim’s most revealing portraits is of Bao Tong, an outspoken former
senior
official in Beijing who was imprisoned for seven years after the
crackdown and
still lives under constant surveillance. She says that from Mr Bao’s
perspective the suppression of the protests was the “defining act” of
modern-day China, accounting for its major ills today: rampant
corruption, lack
of trust in the government, a widespread morality crisis and the
ascendancy of
the security apparatus. The Chinese may not be so quick to blame the
1989
bloodshed, but most would recognise these symptoms.
Ms Lim’s
book is a meticulously reported account of the events of that night and
what
has followed. It is particularly good at showing the extent of the
pro-democracy movement—and the reaction to it. Protests erupted in more
than 80
Chinese cities. Ms Lim writes at length about previously unreported
unrest in
Chengdu. She has painstakingly assembled detailed evidence of the
beating of
dozens of protesters in a hotel courtyard by Chinese police, many of
them
apparently to death. In Chengdu, as elsewhere outside the capital, the
authorities found they were not constrained by foreign television
footage when
they drafted their official versions of what happened. Ms Lim says
Chengdu
provides “nearly the perfect case study in first re-writing history,
then
excising it altogether”. It is a sad reflection on the outside world’s
ability
to monitor a country of China’s size and secretiveness that it has
taken 25
years for the record of this one provincial city to be set at least
somewhat
straighter.
Nổi dậy già đi, nạn nhân
cay đắng
25 năm, kể từ
thảm sát Thiên An Môn, và những chi tiết mới.
Louis Lim,
trong cuốn sách mới, “Cộng Hòa Nhân Dân của Sự Lãng Quên: Thiên An Môn
nhìn lại”,
nhận định TAM trở thành một cái trục mà lịch sử TQ hiện đại xoay quanh
nó. Tuy
nhiên thế hệ trẻ biết ít về nó, và tỏ ra đếch cần. Ít người biết đến
bức hình lịch
sử 1 người cản 1 đoàn xe tăng, và đây là do nhà nước TQ tìm đủ mọi cách
để gạch
nó ra khỏi hồi ức của nhân dân TQ. Cái sự hoành tráng về kinh tế của TQ
hiện
nay chứng minh vụ đàn áp có lý.
Năm nay nhà
nước TQ vờ luôn TAM.
Tuy nhiên cái
phần chìm của hồi ức mới dũng mãnh, dai dẳng, theo tác giả.
Twenty-five
years ago to the day I write this, I watched and listened as thousands
of
Chinese citizens in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square dared to condemn their
leaders.
Some shouted “Premier Li Peng resign.” Even braver ones cried “Down
with Deng
Xiaoping and the Communist Party.” Before long, on the night of June
3–4, the
People’s Liberation Army crashed into the square, rolling over the
tents
pitched there by industrial workers who had joined in the protests, and
mowing
down unarmed demonstrators. Until then, crowds in the square had walked
wherever they pleased rather than standing on one of the numbered
paving stones
in that vast space. For decades, those who went there to see and hear
national
leaders were instructed to stand on a particular stone and shout
prescribed
slogans. But in May 1989, students and ordinary people were engaged in
something the Communist Party has never been able to tolerate: zifade,
“spontaneous” demonstrations.
That
spontaneity spread from Inner Mongolia to Guangzhou. In Beijing,
instead of the usual greeting between acquaintances, “Have you eaten
yet?”
people asked, “Have you demonstrated yet?” Police and soldiers had
almost
disappeared, and the staff of the Party’s newspapers.
Thay vì chào
nhau, “ăn cơm chưa?”, thì là, “biểu tình chưa?”
Trong bài viết
trên tờ NYRB, “Chúng ta đã lầm về Thiên An Môn”, Jonathan Mirsky, nhận
xét, đây
là 1 cuộc biểu tình tự phát, và nó lan rộng ra nhiều nơi, nhiều thành
phố, và
ông kết luận, nước Tẫu sẽ không như trước nữa.
Và bi giờ, ông cay đắng
thú
nhận, chúng ta đã lầm, Tẫu vưỡn là Tẫu.
Gấu cũng có thể lập lại
lời của ông, Bắc Kít thì vưỡn luôn luôn là Bắc Kít.
Và Gấu cũng,
vưỡn mượn lời của ông, khi hỏi 1 người dừng chổi đứng nghe:
Tôi nhớ tới
một bà già quét đường vào năm 1990, ở 1 góc phố Hà Lội, đang lúi húi
hót 1 cục
kít Bắc Kít, liệu sẽ khá hơn trước, bà trả lời, Hà Lội thì như 1 cục
kít, dọn sạch
bên ngoài, nhưng bên trong vưỡn là kít!
Hà, hà!
I am
reminded of the old street sweeper in 1990 at a corner in Beijing. She
was
shoveling donkey dung into a pail. I asked her if she thought things
had
changed for the better. She replied, “This city is like donkey dung.
Clean and
smooth on the outside, but inside it’s still shit.”
Pro-democracy student protesters sit
face to face with policemen outside the Great Hall of the People in
Tiananmen Square, Beijing, April 22, 1989
Twenty-five years ago to the day I write this, I watched
and listened as thousands of Chinese citizens in Beijing’s Tiananmen
Square dared to condemn their leaders. Some shouted “Premier Li Peng
resign.” Even braver ones cried “Down with Deng Xiaoping and the
Communist Party.” Before long, on the night of June 3–4, the People’s
Liberation Army crashed into the square, rolling over the tents pitched
there by industrial workers who had joined in the protests, and mowing
down unarmed demonstrators. Until then, crowds in the square had walked
wherever they pleased rather than standing on one of the numbered
paving stones in that vast space. For decades, those who went there to
see and hear national leaders were instructed to stand on a particular
stone and shout prescribed slogans. But in May 1989, students and
ordinary people were engaged in something the Communist Party has never
been able to tolerate: zifade, “spontaneous” demonstrations.
That spontaneity spread from Inner Mongolia to
Guangzhou. In Beijing, instead of the usual greeting between
acquaintances, “Have you eaten yet?” people asked, “Have you
demonstrated yet?” Police and soldiers had almost disappeared, and the
staff of the Party’s newspapers appeared in the square holding high a
banner bearing the words “We don’t want to lie anymore.” A few days
before the killings, thousands of unarmed soldiers marched towards the
square only to be scolded by elderly women and shamed into turning
back. A column of tanks had been stalled on the edge of the city, where
young men urinated on their treads while local women offered the crews
cups of tea. In late May, I and several other journalists watched those
tanks turn away, along with truckloads of soldiers, who had been
blocked and rebuked in the suburbs before they, too, drove off. Now I
really thought the Party was finished. How wrong we were—foreign
reporters (I was a correspondent for The Observer in those
days), China-watchers abroad, and many Chinese themselves. During a
television interview in the square I said that, while I couldn’t
predict, I was confident “China would never be the same again.” I wrote
several opinion pieces for my paper saying much the same, surer about
Chinese affairs than I had ever been.
On the night of the army’s entry into the center of
Beijing I stood on one of the marble bridges under Mao’s portrait over
the gate into the Forbidden City that faced onto the square. Shots
sounded ever louder and as the army advanced under the dark red walls
of the City a young man next to me shouted that the streaks in the
darkness, even the sparks flashing off the stones, were “blanks.”
Seconds later he slumped over the railing with a widening red circle on
his t-shirt. No longer the China-expert, I turned to leave. My way was
blocked by some Armed Police, who said, “You motherfucking foreign
journalist,” knocked out five of my teeth, and fractured my left arm.
Their officer was shooting people they had beaten to the ground and
would have shot me if the Financial Times’s Robert Thompson
had not bravely walked over and led me away.
The next morning, Sunday, June 4, I cycled back to the
edge of the square just in time to see soldiers mow down parents of
students who had come to look for those who had not returned home and
who were feared to have been killed and their bodies burned. While I
lay in the grass at the side of the avenue, doctors and nurses from the
Peking Union Hospital (where my father had briefly worked in the early
Thirties) arrived in an ambulance and in their bloodstained gowns went
among the fallen; the soldiers shot them down, too. I managed to fly
back to London later that day.
Hundreds were shot in the square that night and the
following morning, or crushed by tanks, and the shooting up and down
the streets and avenues of the capital continued for several days. Long
red and gold signs hanging outside buildings that had said, “Support
the Students,” were quickly replaced with others proclaiming, “Support
the Party.” A decree went out: “No Laughing in Tiananmen Square.” Tank
tread-marks scarred the main roads for a year and bullet holes
pockmarked the buildings along those roads. Those scars remained until
1990 when the center of capital was scoured clean for the Asian Games.
All over China citizens were arrested immediately after
the shootings, and workers in Shanghai were executed. Nobel Peace
Prize-winner Liu Xiaobo, now serving eleven years for encouraging a
pro-democracy manifesto, received the first of his several prison
sentences right after June 4 for exhorting students in the square to
demand democracy as well as an end to corruption. Party General
Secretary Zhao Ziyang was placed under house arrest until his death
sixteen years later, for urging that the students be treated
respectfully. I was standing nearby on May 19 when Zhao came into the
square and apologized to the demonstrators for having come “too late,
too late,” with Wen Jiabao, later premier, standing behind him.
General
Secretary of the Communist Party Zhao Zhiyang (left) talking to
protesters in Tiananmen Square with future premier Wen Jiabao behind
him, May 19, 1989
Since the killings Tiananmen has remained the Communist
Party’s most destructive and revealing dilemma. As Perry Link explained
in a recent post,
The Chinese government’s use of lethal force was no
accident. It was a choice, the result of calculation, and moreover was,
from the regime’s point of view—now as well as then—the correct choice.
We know from The Tiananmen Papers that people at the top of
the Communist Party of China felt that they were facing an existential
threat in spring 1989. Major protests in the streets not only of
Beijing but of nearly every provincial capital in China led Vice
President Wang Zhen, Prime Minister Li Peng, and others in the ruling
circle to conclude that the survival of their regime was at stake.
Deng Xiaoping engineered the crackdown and for some
years in Beijing, late at night on the anniversary of Tiananmen, one
could hear the tinkle of little bottles, xiaoping, a play on
Deng’s name.
Now, as the twenty-fifth anniversary of the killings
looms, the usual suspects are being rounded up, notably Professor Ding
Zilin, founder of the several hundred-strong Tiananmen Mothers, the
group of women whose children were killed on the night of June 3–4. The
authorities have also detained
human rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang, who vowed
in the square that night that if he were not killed he would return to
the spot every year. One of the signers of Charter
08, linked to Liu Xiaobo, Pu contended that,
If I just slouch along through life, taking the easy
route, what do I say to the spirits of those murdered “rioters” of
seventeen years ago? And if everyone forgets, are we not opening the
door to future massacres? Our Tiananmen generation is now in middle
age; we are in positions where we can make a difference. Do we not want
to?
Can the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party still be
terrified of what happened twenty-five years ago? Yes. Indeed, I may
have been inadvertently right in May 1989 when I said China would
“never be the same again.” It is sleeker, richer, internationally more
reckless, more corrupt—and its leaders are ever more terrified. They
have just imprisoned an outspoken journalist, Gao Yu, for “revealing
state secrets.” These are lodged in the anodyne-sounding “Document
Number Nine,” now being read to closed Party meetings around the
country, and include the condemnation of “Western values,” specifically
constitutional democracy and the universality of human rights, the very
concepts Liu Xiaobo called for in Tiananmen Square in May 1989 along
with the original three-hundred signers, now at least two thousand, of
Charter 08. These are not secrets. For the Chinese Communist party they
are radioactive. One of the indefatigable wits on China’s closely
monitored Internet recently wrote, “Remember May 35th.”
I am reminded of the old street sweeper in 1990 at a
corner in Beijing. She was shoveling donkey dung into a pail. I asked
her if she thought things had changed for the better. She replied,
“This city is like donkey dung. Clean and smooth on the outside, but
inside it’s still shit.”