|
Đây là "công án thiền":
Cởi
chuông, là phải người buộc chuông.
Chế độ CS Liên Xô chấm dứt, vào lúc, hai ông đoàn viên Cẩm Sờ Mồm,
Komsomol, là Goóc Ba Chóp [Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev sinh ngày 2
tháng Ba, 1931 tại Privolnoye, Stavropol province. Ông học Đại học
Moscow, tốt nghiệp Luật. Gia nhập Đảng CS năm 1952, và là Bí thư thứ
nhất Đoàn TNCS, First Secretary of Stavropol City Committee of
Komsomol, nhiệm kỳ 1955-1958] gặp Schevarnadze Eduard (1928-) trong một
cuộc họp đoàn, và hai anh đoàn viên này, do đã đọc Tam Quốc, nhớ cái
đoạn Tôn Quyền và Lưu Bị chém đá, bèn chỉ "viên gạch" là chủ nghĩa CS,
mà nói: Hai ta phải chém bể viên gạch này. (1)
In 1995,
after an assassination attempt in Georgia. Credit Associated Press (1)
After the
Soviet collapse in 1991 Mr Shevardnadze headed home to Georgia, where
independence had brought bloody strife and economic collapse. Though he
became
the only politician to have been foreign minister of one country and
head of
state of another, his record was at best mixed. He eventually ended the
fighting, jailing two of the warlords who had put him in power,
sidelining the
third, and escaping several assassination attempts.
But for all
his courage, skill and brains, he had always been better at preaching
democracy
than practising it. Though not personally corrupt, he ruled through an
intricate web of favours and blackmail. For many Georgians, sleaze and
stagnation soon came to outweigh stability.
Can đảm,
tài
năng, có đầu óc, nhưng chỉ để giảng đạo, không phải để hành đạo!
Bị ám sát hụt
mấy lần!
Posted by Natalia
Antelava
Eduard Shevardnadze, the man who helped to end the Cold
War and who died this weekend, at the age of eighty-six, entered my
consciousness on a cold winter evening in 1992, the year that Georgia,
where I was born, fell apart. Separatists were at war in the provinces
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; in the capital, Tbilisi, snipers had
moved onto the roofs of the old city. Until 1991, we had lived in the
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Now Tbilisi burned, riven by
warring militiamen who couldn’t agree on the country’s independent
future. Breadlines stretched for hours. There was no electricity or
running water, and—to my great delight at the time—there was no school.
We were sitting around the kitchen table playing
Monopoly with real money—hyperinflation had made the post-Soviet
currency “coupon” useless for anything else. The phone rang and my
mother picked it up; in the dim light of a kerosene lamp, I could see
the tension on her face. The phone always brought bad news:
kidnappings, deaths, goodbyes from friends who had found a way to
leave. But this time, as she listened to the voice on the other end of
the line, my mother’s expression grew lighter, her tone more hopeful.
When she finally hung up, she paused for effect before triumphantly
delivering the news: Shevardnadze, she told us, was coming home.
Shevardnadze was a rock star of Cold War politics and a
co-architect, with Mikhail Gorbachev, of perestroika. As Gorbachev’s
foreign minister, he was instrumental in bringing about some of the
era’s most radical changes: the pullout of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan, the demilitarization of Eastern Europe, and the
reunification of Germany, something that Soviet leaders had previously
opposed. His wit, charisma, and courage won over Western leaders. Then,
in 1990, acting on his disillusionment in a way that Gorbachev never
did, he stood up in front of the Communist Party Congress and, in a
dramatic speech, resigned from his post, because, he said, reform was
failing and “dictatorship is
advancing.” Now he was going back to his homeland, Georgia.
Georgians were waiting, anxiously. Many of them repeated
a joke: Two men are dragging a statue of Shevardnadze up a steep hill.
“Why do you bother?” a passerby asks. “Just leave him down below and
he’ll climb up himself.” The joke expressed a common hope.
Shevardnadze, as Georgians saw it, was born in a small village, the son
of a teacher, and joined the Communist Party at the age of twenty and
then ascended global heights. They wanted him to do so again and bring
the country with him.
He brought bitter disappointment. Instead of prosperity,
he ushered in a decade of corruption, nepotism, and missed
opportunities. Every achievement of Shevardnadze’s rule was offset by a
great failure: He ended a civil war, but allowed lawlessness and
violent crime to rule. He signed some pro-Western reforms, but Georgia
approached the very top of Transparency International’s corruption
index. His connections in the West helped him turn Georgia into one of
the largest per-capita recipients of U.S. aid, but little of it reached
the population. He introduced the national currency, the lari, but the
economy was in tatters.
“May he rest in peace, but for me Shevardnadze will
always equal humiliation,” my neighbor Maya Kipiani told me, on the day
Shevardnadze passed away in Tbilisi. I’d asked her what he’d meant to
her. Maya, who is retired, received a pension that, in the Shevardnadze
years, was worth just seven dollars a month. What hurt even more, she
told me, was when Shevardnadze’s wife, Nanuli Shevardnadze, announced
on state television that a good housewife should be able to manage just
fine with that kind of money. “They didn’t think we were human. They
laughed at us.”
For Maya, like for tens of thousands of others, the
breaking point came in 2003, when Shevardnadze’s party rigged a
parliamentary election. Tens of thousands of protesters took to the
streets, and on November
22nd a group of demonstrators, waving roses as a sign of their
nonviolent intent, broke into parliament just as Shevardnadze was about
to address the chamber. His bodyguards rushed him out of the building
through a back door. Seconds later, the thirty-six-year-old opposition
leader Mikheil Saakashvili took his place on the stage. He gulped down
Shevardnadze’s cup of tea, slammed the cup against the desk, and, still
waving a rose, announced that the revolution had won.
A few months after the Rose Revolution, I interviewed
Shevardnadze for the BBC, in the residence on top of a hill that he was
allowed to keep after resigning. Babu (“grandfather”), as Georgians
called him, looked old and fragile.
“Americans built this house for me; the walls are
bulletproof. You are very safe here,” he said, smiling. Shevardnadze
had survived assassination attempts in 1995 and 1998, and Americans, he
told me, made sure that he became the best-protected President in the
world. As we spoke, pictures of James Baker, George H. W. Bush, and
Ronald Reagan looked down from the walls. I asked him whether he felt
betrayed when the West had a change of heart and didn’t support him
during his last battle for power.
“No,” he said. “Americans are like that. They like to
back the opposition.” It could have been different, he added, if he had
kept a tighter grip on the country. “Democracy was my main goal. Often
power is tempting. It’s tempting to slam your fist against the table
and make people scared of you. And if I had done it, this [revolution]
would not have happened.”
“But my biggest achievement was that I fought the
temptation. I was a Communist and I became the man of democratic
principles,” he told me. He got annoyed with me for challenging him on
issues like the freedom of the press. But he was keen to talk about his
role in ending the Soviet war in Afghanistan and in bringing down the
Berlin Wall. Germans, he told me, had invited him to move to Berlin,
but he wanted to stay home, close to the grave of his wife, which he
visited frequently.
“I don’t get out much these days. The family tells me I
should take better care of myself and go for walks. But maybe later,”
he said. We spoke for hours, and when it was finally time for me to
leave Shevardnadze walked me to the door and gave me an unexpected hug.
“Come again,” he said, releasing the embrace. “It gets lonely up here.”
Obituary
[The Economist]
Eduard
Shevardnadze
Eduard
Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister and then president of Georgia,
died on July 7th aged 86
THE obscure provincial leader was at first sight an unlikely choice to
be foreign minister of the world’s largest country. Eduard Shevardnadze
did not even want the job: he spoke only his native Georgian and
heavily accented Russian, had no important foreign contacts, and had
barely travelled abroad. But Mikhail Gorbachev was immovable. The new
Soviet leader wanted big changes—and the “Silver Fox”, his friend since
the 1950s, to make them.
After
decades in which policy had crunched downhill like a glacier, the new
man at the foreign ministry brought stunning shifts. Its trademark
surly silence gave way to openness and charm. Taboos flew out of the
window. He decried ideology and the class struggle, once the
mainsprings of foreign policy, as useless. Arms spending too: it
brought weakness, not strength. Only friendship with the West could end
backwardness and isolation.
Deeds
matched the words. He ended the Soviet Union’s proxy wars in Africa,
Latin America and Asia, hurrying the Red Army home from its futile and
bloody mission in Afghanistan. At arms-control talks with America
knotty negotiating problems unravelled overnight. The danger of nuclear
war abated. He buried most of the Soviet empire in Europe, and played
midwife to a united Germany, saying allies were better than subjects:
“It is time to realise that neither socialism, nor friendship, nor
good-neighbourliness, nor respect, can be produced by bayonets, tanks
or blood.”
Even
hawkish Americans realised that the Soviet Union truly wanted to end
the cold war. Mr Shevardnadze forged notable friendships with his
American and German counterparts. The hardliners back home, with their
grumbling jargon and rigid mindsets, were a greater obstacle.
Seemingly,
he was cut from the same cloth. He had joined the party at the height
of the Stalin era. A ferocious local official, he brought even the
sybaritic Georgians to follow Party discipline. A possibly apocryphal
story relates how he called a show of hands on some anodyne motion at a
meeting of senior officials, on his first day as anti-corruption chief
there. As the grey-clad arms went up, he inspected every wrist—and
remarked caustically how strange it was that the servants of the
proletariat could afford pricey Western watches. Other tactics were
tougher: mass arrests, beatings, torture and executions. He jailed
dissidents and cracked down on those trying to defend Georgian language
and culture from Russification.
It
worked well, for him. Having shown the Kremlin the extent of corruption
in Georgia, he was given the republic to run. Control of the best food,
wine, scenery and hospitality in the Soviet Union proved a fine way to
forge important friendships.
But
behind the outward appearance of sycophantic loyalty to a brutal system
was a different man. Yes, he had been a true believer, but he also knew
that his father had narrowly escaped death in Stalin’s purges. His
beloved Nanuli was the daughter of an enemy of the people, but he
risked his career and married her anyway—declining to “sacrifice love
to hatred”, he wrote later. He secretly shared his despair over the
Soviet Union’s failures with the young Mr Gorbachev, his counterpart in
the nearby Russian province of Stavropol. Both men saw that only
radical change could avert catastrophic collapse.
Outfoxed
But
unlike Mr Gorbachev, the Georgian went further. Back home he had
allowed the making of “Repentance”, an explosive allegorical film
(banned by censors) about the crimes of Stalinism. His experiments in
economic liberalisation in Soviet Georgia had been successful, but they
made him conclude that socialism was unworkable, not reformable. He saw
far more clearly than his boss the danger of a hardline backlash. Their
friendship frayed. As the shadows darkened over Moscow in the winter of
1990, he spectacularly resigned, with an emotional speech warning of
looming dictatorship. For many, that marked the real end of the era of
glasnost and perestroika.
After
the Soviet collapse in 1991 Mr Shevardnadze headed home to Georgia,
where independence had brought bloody strife and economic collapse.
Though he became the only politician to have been foreign minister of
one country and head of state of another, his record was at best mixed.
He eventually ended the fighting, jailing two of the warlords who had
put him in power, sidelining the third, and escaping several
assassination attempts.
But
for all his courage, skill and brains, he had always been better at
preaching democracy than practising it. Though not personally corrupt,
he ruled through an intricate web of favours and blackmail. For many
Georgians, sleaze and stagnation soon came to outweigh stability.
There
were some successes. New east-west oil and gas pipelines across
Georgian territory helped break Russia’s export monopoly, and put the
country on America’s map. He encouraged bright young Georgians to study
abroad; one of them was his later nemesis, a brash, polygot lawyer
called Mikheil Saakashvili. Egregious election-rigging in 2003 sparked
the “Rose revolution”, in which an indignant mob, led by the glitzy
young English-speakers, hustled a bewildered and indignant “Silver Fox”
into retirement. Too much democracy, he said crossly, was a mistake.
|
|